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LexisNexis Summary
… Rather, and as the Civil Rights Acts of both the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries make clear, the civil
rights of which we cannot be discriminatorily deprived by
virtue of those laws notably include the right to: contract,
own and sell property, make a will, testify in court, sue for
injuries wrongfully inflicted upon us, and the right to be
protected by the state against private or public acts of
violence. … THE NATURAL RIGHT TO CONTRACT
AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS I am going to
call the familiar understanding of the right to contract where
civil rights laws in particular and civil society in general are
in such apparent tension, a ″self-sovereignty″ conception of
that right. … The civil right to contract then guarantees us
access to those laws and institutions that structure our
markets for consumer goods, protecting our participation in
those markets. … Again, the conflict between civil rights
and contract rights stems from viewing civil rights as simply
anti-discrimination rights, and contract rights as
quasi-constitutional or natural rights of individual self
sovereignty, delineating a sphere within which the individual
has sole authority to determine whether, with whom, and on
what terms to assume other-regarding obligations. … We
enter the workforce, schooling, commercial markets, and
health care through contracts of employment, enrollment,
sale and purchase, or insurance.
Text
[*551]
The ″right to contract,″ whether originating in the
Constitution, common law, or natural law, has been long and
widely felt to be in tension with our civil rights, broadly
conceived. 1 The individual himself, we generally believe,
and only the individual, should decide the scope and terms
of his affirmative, voluntary, and other-regarding
undertakings. When he does so through contract, the
individual and only the individual should determine the
terms under which he will perform those duties. The civil
rights laws of the nineteenth, twentieth, and early twenty-first
centuries, and the various rights they create interfere with
these natural freedoms.
So, for example, our freedom to hire whomever we wish to
hire, and then our freedom to fire them at will is
compromised by our obligation under the Civil Rights Acts
of 1964 2 to not discriminate against candidates for
employment or for promotions on impermissible grounds of
race, sex, ethnicity, age, or disability, at least according to
early critics of those Acts. We no longer have the right to
contract for employment with whomever we wish and on
whatever terms we desire because of the impact of these
laws. Likewise, our freedom to sell or rent our home to
whomever we wish is compromised by the civil rights of
others to not suffer discrimination in housing or rental
markets. 3 Again, we do not have the right to contract for the
sale, purchase, or rental of our property with whomever we
wish, and on whatever terms we desire, and we do not have
such a right, in part, by virtue of various civil rights laws.
1 See, e.g., Robert Dugan, Civil Rights and Freedom of Contract: Employment, Housing and Credit Transactions (Part I -
Employment), 26 S.D. L. Rev. 259, 259-60 (1981) (exploring tensions between civil rights to nondiscrimination and rights of contract);
see also, e.g., Davison M. Douglas, Contract Rights and Civil Rights, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1541, 1541-42 (2001) (reviewing David
Bernstein, Only One Place of Redress: African-Americans, Labor Regulations, and the Courts from Reconstruction to the New Deal
(2001), which argued that African-Americans were helped by the Lochner Court’s laissez faire philosophy, more than by the regulatory
apparatus of state regulation).
2 See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at scattered sections of Titles 2, 28, and
42 of United States Code) (stating that one of the purposes of the Act is to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity).
3 See generally Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.§§3601-3619 (2012)
(prohibiting the refusal to sell, rent, or negotiate the sale or rental of a property for discriminatory reasons).
Similarly, our right to contract for the sale of our labor, for
whatever wages for which we can bargain, and on [*552]
whatever terms we manage to strike is seemingly
compromised by what are widely viewed as ″civil rights″ to
a minimum wage and fair working conditions, which are
enforced by various legal regimes coming out of the New
Deal. More recently, various entitlements flowing from the
Family and Medical Leave Act 4 also substantially alter
terms of employment contracts, regardless of the will of the
contracting parties. That Act as well is widely understood as
protecting the civil rights of nondiscrimination against
parents or caregivers in the workplace.
Presumably, all of these civil rights either prevent some
labor contracts from being consummated at all or dictate the
terms of those that do come to fruition. To take one further
example, our felt right to contract only when we voluntarily
consent to do so, and to refuse to contract whenever we so
desire, is compromised by our newly crafted obligation
under the Affordable Care Act 5 to purchase health insurance,
an obligation clearly aimed at insuring to all Americans a
secure civil right to health care. So again, the natural right
to contract, or to not contract seems to be badly compromised
by the civil right to health care, as neatly captured and then
popularized by the reductio argument employed by advocates
and Supreme Court Justices alike that mandating the
purchase of health insurance, as the Affordable Care Act
tries to do, is tantamount to ordering all of us to go to the
store and purchase a head of broccoli. 6 If the ″individual
mandate″ is required by a broad civil right to health care,
then that civil right too is in tension with our right to
contract.
More generally, or more abstractly, our natural right to
contract is seemingly in conflict not only with our civil
rights laws, but also with at least some very general
obligations of civil society, such as, for example, the duty to
help others if such help can be given without undue
hardship, or our various duties - whether legal or moral - to
assist family members, neighbors, or co-citizens, solely by
virtue of close relational affinity. At the root of both this
more general tension, and that between contract and the
rights flowing from our various civil rights acts, I believe in
a modern sense, that our obligations today should flow
solely from voluntary acts of consent and not from either
duties of benevolence, or from our membership in civil
society any more than it should follow from our membership
in a clan, tribe, family, or neighborhood. When we moved so
famously from [*553] status to contract as the font of legal
obligation, we have come to believe, perhaps, that we shed
not only obviously noxious sources of non-voluntary
obligation such as enslavement or marital status, but more
benign ones as well, such as membership in a civil society
that is committed to such social projects like the racial and
sexual integration of our workplaces and schools, or the
health, safety, education, and well being of all citizens. Our
obligations today, we tend to think, should stem from what
we have agreed to do, and not from what or who we are,
including not only our race, or gender, or class but also,
apparently, our civil identity. From within the logic of our
commitment to contractual freedom, civil society and its
projects, including the project of achieving some measure of
racial or sexual justice, is not the source of obligation any
more than race, class, or gender itself should be. Rather,
contract is the source of obligation, and to the extent civil
society and the civil rights obligations that partly constitute
it impose obligations outside of contract, it is felt to be in
tension with those freedoms and rights.
In these comments I want to resist this tension; thus, I will
ultimately argue that the felt tension between a right to
contract and civil rights, as well as between the idea of
contract and the obligations of civil society, although plenty
real enough, rests on an unduly narrow conception of both
the idea of contract and the idea of civil rights. The widely
shared understanding of a right to contract as delineating a
separate sphere of unadulterated individual sovereignty,
within which the state may not intrude, comes to us, I will
suggest, in part, from the now discredited constitutional
jurisprudence of the Lochner era. 7 Although the
constitutional law from that era is no longer good law as is
widely conceded--today, we do not have a constitutional
right to contract that gives us full sovereignty over whether,
with whom, and on what terms to contract - nevertheless,
our contemporary general understanding of both what the
natural right to contract is, and what the constitutional right
should mean, or could mean, or would mean, if only we had
one, or, perhaps, what it will mean, if we ever get a Court
4 Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, Pub. L. No, 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§2601-2654
(2012)).
5 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified at scattered sections of Titles 4, 18,
21, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 21, and 42 of the United States Code).
6 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012).
7 See infra Part I.
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that gives it back to us, is heavily determined by that
constitutional jurisprudence. Thus, the understood
contemporary meaning of the idea of a ″right to contract,″
which is in such tension with the civil rights acts and other
obligations of civil society, is largely an overhang from a
discarded constitutional jurisprudence. The meaning that
jurisprudence has given us of the right to contract, however,
was never discarded; what we left behind was the faith that
it is protected by the constitution.
[*554] The Lochnerian meaning of the ″right to contract″ is
not, however, the only possible social meaning of that right
available to us, and Lochnerian jurisprudence is not the only
historical context in which the right to contract has played a
role in our positive and fundamental law. A very different
understanding of both the content and meaning of the right
to contract, I will argue, comes from the civil rights
traditions themselves. ″Civil rights″ are widely understood
today, as meaning roughly rights of nondiscrimination: our
civil rights are our rights not to be discriminated against on
the basis of impermissible characteristics. This is the
understanding of ″civil rights″ that is in tension with our
understanding of the natural and Lochnerian era’s
constitutional right to contract. But this understanding of
″civil rights″ as ″antidiscrimination rights″ is clearly
inadequate for two reasons. First, over the century, we have
used the phrase ″civil rights″ to include a number of rights,
such as free speech rights, rights to the protection of the
state against private violence, labor rights, and union rights,
and, these days, rights to health care or rights to affordable
health insurance. However, these rights have little or nothing
to do with discrimination. So civil rights are clearly not only
antidiscrimination rights. Second, and more to my point
here, even those civil rights that target and then prohibit
discrimination do not do so exclusively. Rather, and as the
Civil Rights Acts of both the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries make clear, the civil rights of which we cannot be
discriminatorily deprived by virtue of those laws notably
include the right to: contract, own and sell property, make a
will, testify in court, sue for injuries wrongfully inflicted
upon us, and the right to be protected by the state against
private or public acts of violence. These are civil rights too.
Thus, our civil rights include not only rights to be free of
discrimination, but also a number of common law rights,
including rights derived from the common law legal regimes
of contract and property law, of which we cannot be
discriminatorily deprived. The ″right to contract,″ whatever
its status as a constitutional right, is clearly a civil right and
has been since it was declared as such in the Civil Rights
Act of the mid-nineteenth century. 8
What is the nature of the right to contract, understood not as
a Lochnerian right of individual sovereignty, but instead as
one of a number of civil rights, and of which, according to
our civil rights laws, we cannot be deprived? Below I will
argue that the civil right to contract is quite different from
the constitutional right, or the natural right to contract
because it was defended by the Supreme Court during the
Lochner era and continues to have such an impact on our
political imaginations. The civil, [*555] rather than
constitutional, right to contract has a different historical
pedigree. It rests on a different jurisprudential conception of
the point of contract, and it stands in a very different relation
to the civil society from which it originates. Finally, when
understood as itself a civil right, the ″right to contract″ is
clearly not in conflict with our civil rights laws in toto, or
with more general obligations of civil society. Rather, the
civil right to contract is fully consonant with our statutory
civil rights, both to nondiscrimination and more broadly. In
fact, far from limiting the civil right to contract, our civil
rights in toto, both the nineteenth century ones and our more
modern ones, quite dramatically extend and deepen it.
In the first section below, I delineate what I believe to be the
still-dominant and quasi-constitutional conception of the
right to contract, as it has been understood at least from the
Lochner era to today. 9 In the second section, I contrast the
Lochnerian constitutional right to contract with the civil
right to contract. 10 In the third section, I show that the civil
right to contract, unlike the constitutional one, is fully
consistent with our modern civil rights laws and broadly
understood. 11 In the third section, I also explore the
relationship between the civil right to contract and civil
society, where I will suggest that rather than being in tension
with it, the civil right to contract is one of the core, and
perhaps the core architectural foundations of civil society. 12
The conclusion briefly recapitulates the argument.
I. THE NATURAL RIGHT TO CONTRACT AND ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS
8 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, Pub. L. No. 39-26, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
9 See infra part I.
10 See infra part II.
11 See infra part III.
12 See infra part III.
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I am going to call the familiar understanding of the right to
contract where civil rights laws in particular and civil
society in general are in such apparent tension, a
″self-sovereignty″ conception of that right. According to
this view, the ″right to contract″ is a natural, or pre-legal
right that confers sovereign authority on the individual
within some limited and delineated sphere, to decide whether,
with whom, and under what terms to enter contracts that
then become the source of his other-regarding obligations.
The right to contract, so understood, dictates a ″sphere of
sovereignty″ within which the individual is, so to speak, in
full command of his obligations. Within that sphere, the
individual is unencumbered by other, and particularly more
civic obligations. The boundaries of his contractual
obligations thus determine not only what he must do -
basically [*556] he must do as he promised - but also what
he need not do outside of his duties to refrain from harming
others. His legally binding obligations to affirmatively assist
others are determined by no source of authority other than
his own will. This is simply what it means to have a ″right
to contract.″
If that is right, then the obligations imposed on all of us by
our various ″civil rights″ laws are indeed at right angles
with the right to contract in at least three distinct ways. First,
if individual sovereignty is the point of the right to contract,
an individual cannot be required to contract with any
particular person or firm, or to bind himself to any particular
terms. He must be free not to contract, whether for good
reasons, bad reasons, or no reasons at all. A requirement to
contract with particular partners or on particular terms is
even logically oxymoronic, as well as politically noxious.
This is the source of the tension between our felt contract
rights and both antidiscrimination rights in employment and
housing, and New Deal styled labor rights, such as rights to
a minimum wage and decent working conditions. Second, if
the point of the right to contract is individual sovereignty, an
individual cannot be required to enter into a contract, no
matter who it is with and no matter what the terms, whether
for his own good or in furtherance of a larger societal or
communitarian goal. A ″mandatory contract,″ then, is simply
an oxymoron. At common law, for example, as expressed in
a number of iconic cases, an individual - even a professional
- cannot be obligated to come to the aid of another person,
even with an expectation on both sides of eventual payment:
no one can be required to enter a contract to come to the
assistance of another person. 13 Exceptions to this rule are
few and far between. The Contract is the source of obligation,
once entered into, but the assumption of the obligation must
be entirely voluntary. This is the source of the tension
between contract rights and the insurance mandate in the
Affordable Care Act, or the tension between the idea of
contract rights and the hypothetical state directive to buy
broccoli.
Third, and somewhat more ambitiously, on the
self-sovereignty conception of the right to contract, an
individual cannot be imposed upon to provide aid or
assistance to others outside the realm of his or her
contractual, consensual undertakings, beyond those
obligations not to harm that are imposed by criminal law or
a narrowly drawn law of tort. This is what it means to move
from ″status to contract,″ and this is the source of the
tension between contract rights and the obligations of civil
society, including both the various statutorily imposed
obligations to assist others, [*557] and any legally enforced
duties of generalized benevolence. This larger conflict is
perfectly captured in a pivotal scene in The Great Gatsby
when the wealthy, ″old moneyed,″ Tom Buchanan explains
to his car mechanic George Wilson that he, Buchanan, does
not have to sell his car to him, and if he chooses not to,
Buchanan explains, he owes Wilson ″no obligations … at
all.″ 14 If there is no contractual obligation, there is no
obligation at all, as Buchanan says, and whether or not there
is a contractual obligation is within the domain of
self-sovereignty. As Buchanan explains to Wilson, in the
absence of contract, Buchanan owes Wilson nothing. All
that he might owe him, conversely, is what he has promised,
or perhaps, what he would have promised, had transaction
costs been low enough to facilitate the contract - our post
status-to-contract understanding of the meaning of tort
obligations. Contract, either real or hypothetical, exhausts
the realm of obligation.
Where did this ″self-sovereignty″ conception of contract -
as conferring absolute rights on the individual to determine
whether, with whom, and on what terms to contract, and
then limiting our obligations to those promises - come
from? Obviously, the ″right to contract″ so understood, and
that seemingly conflicts with both our civil rights laws and
with the obligations of civil society, is not a purely legal
construct. It did not come, for example, from the common
law of contract. The common law courts have, after all,
found occasion to fashion quasi-contracts that impose
mandatory contracts on parties who have not consented to
them, constructed terms requiring good faith, lack of duress,
13 See, e.g., Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901).
14 F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby 114 (Scribner trade paperback edition 2004) (1925).
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and substantive conscionability in all contracts regardless of
the parties’ consent, and have even deigned to dictate who
may and who may not enter contracts: those over the age of
majority, but not those under the age of majority, and those
who are deemed competent, but not those who are deemed
incompetent, and so on. The individual sovereignty
conception of contract cannot be pinned on the common
law.
So, again, where did it come from? One possibility, is that
the popular American conception of a natural ″right to
contract″ that preserves a sphere of self-sovereignty is
rooted in our relatively short-lived history of a constitutional
″right to contract,″ once recognized by the Supreme Court
as protected by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 15 and which reached its high point in the early
1900’s, in such cases as Lochner [*558] v. New York and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 16 In those cases, and in that era,
the individual right to contract protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution, did indeed protect an individual’s
pre-existing natural liberty, or right, to decide whether, with
whom, and on what terms to contract, and thereby assume
other-regarding obligations. 17 That constitutional right to
contract no longer has much, if any, constitutional
significance - it was effectively gutted by the constructive
reversal of Lochner in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 18 and
then in the Court’s repudiation of its laissez faire and
radically individualistic assumptions in subsequent decades.
Thus, it is now universally understood that it is not only
within the police power of the states to modify contract
terms to dictate to some degree with whom one may and
may not contract, and to require some contracts (such as
automobile insurance contracts) as conditions of privileges
(such as driving), and to ban entirely other contracts - such
as contracts for prostitution, or gambling or surrogacy
pregnancies - as contrary to public policy. However, it is
also within the commerce clause power of the national
government to regulate contracts as well, so long as those
contracts in some way affect interstate commerce. 19 Civil
rights obligations fit squarely within the contours of this
reformed, post-Lochnerian constitutional jurisprudence: we
are precluded, by virtue of those laws, from contracting for
housing or labor with whomever we please and on whatever
terms we can wrest. Thus, now we do not have, if we ever
had, an absolute constitutional right to the contractual
sovereignty described above. We have no constitutional
right to refuse to enter contracts that have been mandated by
a state, or to hire only white people or only men, or to
include in those contracts onerous contract terms that
violate state’s norms of unconscionability, public policy, or
good faith, and so on.
Our contemporary understanding of the content and meaning
of the ″right to contract,″ however, is still strikingly
Lochnerian in its content - we just do not think the
Constitution protects it any longer, at least in as robust a
fashion as it once did. We still tend to mean by that phrase,
a natural right to determine whether, with whom, and on
what terms we will take on other-regarding obligations, that
in turn determines a sphere of freedom into which the state
may not intrude. More briefly, we still, more or less, mean
by that phrase that the individual’s will and only the [*559]
individual’s will is the source of our other-regarding
obligations. That social meaning of the ″right to contract″ is
as dominant today, both in popular consciousness and in
academic discourse, as it was then dominant, in the aughts,
teens, and twenties in constitutional law.
The individual sovereignty conception of the right is, for
example, reflected in a resurgence of Ayn Randian styled
militant anarchism in popular culture, from the new found
cult stature of those novels themselves, to its many more
benign cultural reinterpretations, from The Incredibles, 20 to
24, 21 to The Hunger Games. 22 In all of these, as in Atlas
Shrugged, 23 personal bonds and only personal bonds,
individually willed, rather than civic obligations of any sort,
constitute the floor - the very thin floor - of social
15 See Northwestern Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 252-53 (1906); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
16 See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534; Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
18 See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
19 Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n., 300 U.S. 515, 558 (1937).
20 The Incredibles (Walt Disney Pictures & Pixar Animation Studios 2004).
21 24 (Imagine Entertainment & Twentieth Century Fox Television 2001-2010; 2014).
22 Suzanne Collins, The Hunger Games (2008).
23 Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged (1957).
Page 5 of 11
26 St. Thomas L. Rev. 551, *557
obligation. It is echoed in the rise to power of the Tea Party
within the Republican Party, with its glorification of
contractual freedom, its radical repudiation of civic society,
and the movement’s leader Rand Paul’s explicit repudiation
of the moral authority of the Civil Rights Acts themselves,
with the cited ground being those Acts’ limitation on
individual contractual freedom. 24
It is vividly and ominously reflected in Justice Roberts’
extended discussion, albeit in dicta, of the failure of the
Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate to pass
constitutional scrutiny under the commerce clause: the
mandate, Roberts opined in that decision, does not
sufficiently affect commerce so as to be within Congress’s
regulatory powers because it requires individuals to do
something - contract - rather than simply forbidding them
from contracting in a particular way. 25 That, he argued,
citing virtually no positive or legal authority, simply goes
too far; that, we might surmise precisely by virtue of the
absence of such reliance, violates a natural right of
individuals to decide whether to contract. 26 It violates their
sphere of individual self-sovereignty, and that violation in
turn determines the limit into which the commerce clause
based authority of the federal government may not reach.
In academic discourse, the dominance of this sovereignty
understanding of the right to contract is vividly reflected in
the multiple [*560] reinvigoration and positive
reassessments of Lochner-era jurisprudence that have so
fruitfully challenged the conventional post-Lochner
consensus within the academy over the last decade. Finally,
it is most cleanly reflected in the contours of the most
developed jurisprudential conceptions of contract and of the
moral point of contract: that contract rightly valorizes both
the individual act of consent and individually dictated
consensual transactions, such that, for deontic, Kantian, or
just loosely libertarian reasons all consensual transactions
are regarded as of value solely because of their consensuality.
Alternatively, contract rights and contract law rightly
maximize societal wealth by encouraging individual acts
that promote economic efficiency. Both these libertarian, or
Kantian understandings and the related economic or
efficiency based understandings reflect as well as rest on the
self-sovereignty conception of the right described above:
individual consent and wealth maximization both are
furthered by the self-sovereignty at the heart of the right of
contract, and both are compromised by limits on that
sovereignty. It is that social meaning of the right to contract
that is in felt tension with the obligations attendant upon us
by virtue of the civil rights acts, and the duties imposed
upon us by civil society.
II. THE CIVIL RIGHT TO CONTRACT
Is this neo-Lochnerian understanding of the right to contract
the only understanding available to us? I think not. A very
different understanding of the right to contract can be
derived not from our constitutional history, but from the
history of the civil rights themselves. The right to contract,
well before the Lochner era Court enshrined it as a
constitutional right, was understood not as a limit on civil
rights, but as itself a civil right. It was understood to be one
of a number of such rights guaranteed to us under various
civil rights laws passed by Congress during the
reconstruction on the heels of passage of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The ″right to contract,″ understood
as a civil right, like rights to property and other civil rights,
such as the right to physical protection from the state against
violence, or the right to sue in court for injuries we sustain
cannot be denied because of race. Thus, to quote the Civil
Rights Act of 1866:
And such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to
any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person [(execution,
imprisonment)] and [*561] property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding. 27
The right to contract, according to the framers of the Civil
Rights Act, along with the right to own and sell property,
write a will, sue for injuries, give testimony, and so on are
all rights that cannot be denied on the basis of race. Freed
24 Rand Paul Tripped Up by Civil Rights Act Once Again, MSNBC (Oct. 2, 2013, 2:19 P.M.),
http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/rand-paul-tripped-civil-rights-act, [http://perma.cc/P462-BTNC].
25 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012).
26 See id.
27 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
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slaves were granted the same rights to enter a contract, own,
buy, and sell property, and sue for injuries as whites or at
least as white men. The ″right to contract″ in this context, is
one of the ″civil rights″ of which we cannot be deprived on
account of impermissible characteristics. Indeed it was one
of the original cluster of such rights of which we cannot be
deprived, for impermissible reasons. The right to contract,
then, is itself a ″civil right.″
How might our understanding of the right to contract
change if we were to think of that right as a central civil
right, rather than as a natural right, fitfully protected by
constitutional guarantees? It depends, of course, in large
part on what we mean by a ″civil right.″ I have written about
this at length elsewhere, 28 and will only summarize those
arguments here. As noted above, these days we tend to think
of civil rights as rights of anti-discrimination, but this is
clearly inadequate for reasons mentioned above that bear
repeating: first, a number of what are commonly called civil
rights, such as labor rights, free speech rights, or rights of
criminal defendants, are not rights of antidiscrimination at
all. But second, even our civil rights of antidiscrimination
protect us against the underlying right of which we cannot
be discriminatorily deprived. Thus, we may have rights to
marry, of which we cannot be deprived on the basis of
sexual orientation, and we do have rights to be considered
fairly for a job, of which we cannot be deprived on the basis
of race and gender, and, of course, rights to contract,
property, and to access to the courts, of which we likewise
cannot be deprived by virtue of discrimination. Our
antidiscrimination rights are always complex civil rights;
they are, in effect, ″rights to rights″ with the first right in
that phrase being the antidiscrimination right, and the
second being the civil right, of which we cannot be
deprived. The right to contract is one such civil right. It is a
right of which we cannot be deprived on the basis of race,
sex, or any other impermissible characteristic. The right to
contract itself, though, is a civil right, and has been
recognized as such since at least 1866.
[*562] What is a civil right? Civil rights, in turn, have been
defined, at least since Thomas Paine’s iconic account in his
pamphlet Rights of Man, as natural rights, but a particular
kind of natural rights. Civil rights are those natural rights
which we have not only by virtue of being human - this is
true of all natural rights - but also by virtue of our
membership in civil society, and which we cannot enforce
″on our own.″ 29 Paine defined them in this way:
Natural rights are those [rights] which appertain to man in
right of his existence. Of this kind are all the intellectual
rights, or rights of the mind, and also all those rights of
acting as an individual for his own comfort and happiness,
which are not injurious to the natural rights of others. Civil
rights are those which appertain to man in right of his being
a member of society. Every civil right has for its foundation,
some natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to the
enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all cases,
sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which
relate to security and protection. 30
Thus, the definition of a civil right is threefold: a civil right
is first, a natural right, meaning a right we have by virtue of
being human. Second, it is a natural right, which we enjoy
by virtue of being a member of society. Third, and unlike,
say, rights of conscience, it is a natural right, which we
cannot enforce on our own. Put positively, a civil right is a
right to participate in civil society, which requires the
presence and operation of positive law for its realization. In
other words, it requires the presence rather than absence of
law and legal institutions. Civil rights are, in this limited
sense, quintessential positive rights; they are rights to the
operation of law and the state in such a way as to realize the
individual’s enjoyment of the underlying good or status or
sphere of life the right aims to ensure.
If civil rights are, as Paine argued, natural rights that we
have by virtue not only by being human, but by virtue of our
membership in society and rights that we cannot enforce on
our own and a right to contract, as per the drafters of the
country’s original civil rights law, is itself a civil right,
which must be extended to all including freed slaves, then
what is the right to contract when understood as a civil
right? Obviously the most direct effect of the inclusion of
the right to contract in the 1866 Act is that the contracts of
freed slaves must be enforced in the same way and to the
same degree as the contracts of white men. But what is the
meaning of the ″right to contract″ that must be accordingly
enforced? What is the point, to [*563] borrow from one of
Ronald Dworkin’s most evocative metaphors, 31 of the civil
right to contract that must be so extended? How might it
differ from the conception of a right to contract as a natural
right as described above?
28 See, e.g., Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 713 (2011).
29 See Thomas Paine, Rights of Man 68 (Penguin Classics 1984) (1791).
30 Id.
31 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 228-38 (1986).
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First, the civil right to contract, like all civil rights, is a
natural right, by which Paine meant, a right that attaches by
virtue of one’s humanity, and which we might today
interpret. In more modern terms, borrowing from Nussbaum
and Sen’s naturalist account of human rights, the right is in
service of natural human capabilities conducive to a good
and flourishing life. 32 Human rights are those rights which
protect or further our capabilities which in turn enable us to
flourish. The kind of human interaction manifested in
contract is both a capability of human beings and one that
contributes to our flourishing. But second, if Paine is right
about the meaning of civil rights, and if the framers of the
1866 Act were right that the right to contract is a civil right,
the right to contract is a distinctive kind of natural right. The
right to contract is a right we have by virtue not only of our
humanity alone, but also by virtue of our membership in
civil society. Contract, and the capacity to engage in it, is, in
other words, a creation of civil society. It is not an
implication of our human form alone. Like our other civil
rights, the right to contract, then, is a right of participation.
It is a right to participate in that civil society. It is at heart
a right to be included in that which society facilitates.
More specifically, with respect to the right to contract, it is
a right to participate in the society constructed, more or less,
by contracts. So, we have a natural right to exchange goods
for other goods or services because such behavior furthers
our individual capabilities for living fruitfully, but that is a
natural right that can only be realized through consumer
markets that are structured by law and institutions: not only
laws enforcing contracts, but laws and institutions specifying
rights and parameters of ownership, fair dealing, and
criminal law. The civil right to contract then guarantees us
access to those laws and institutions that structure our
markets for consumer goods, protecting our participation in
those markets. But the market for consumer goods is not the
only area of civil life that contract facilitates, and
participation in those markets is not the only right that the
right of contract confers. For example, civil right to contract
also protects a right to participate in markets for labor,
markets for property, and markets for the pooling of risks
through insurance contracts. Those markets in turn serve
human needs and capabilities that are also, themselves, both
civil and ″natural″ in origin. We have a natural capability
[*564] to enjoy meaningful work, but we need civil society
in order to protect that capability. We need access to the
laws and institutions that structure a workplace that rewards
merit and provides meaningful floors of compensation and
safe working conditions. We access those laws and
institutions, in this society, through contracts for our labor.
A right to contract then, understood as a civil right, protects
our ability to access those laws and institutions that structure
the fair and meaningful labor we have a natural right to
enjoy. Likewise, we have a natural capability to live a long
and healthy life, but we need civil society to protect that
capability. We will not live long and healthily in a state of
nature, rather we need laws and institutions that can
generate medical knowledge and expertise, and its
distribution through networks of provisions of care. We
access those laws and institutions, in turn, in this society,
through contracts. We enter into contracts with doctors and
hospitals, but more fundamentally, contracts with insurers
who in turn pool risk. We have a civil right to access those
networks, and thus a civil right to participate in the pooling
of risk facilitated by insurance policies, itself accomplished
through contract. Thus, we have a civil right to contract for
health insurance. Likewise, we have a natural capability to
enjoy property, and the security and pleasures it bestows,
but we need civil society to protect that capability. We need
both the laws and institutions of private property and
criminal law to generate the protections and securities of
individually owned property. We have a civil right then to
access those laws and institutions, and the way we do so, in
this society, is through contract. Our civil right to contract,
then, guarantees us, in part, rights of access to those laws
and institutions that structure and protect property and its
enjoyment.
Second, and again according to Paine, the civil right to
contract, like all civil rights, is one that cannot be effectuated
by ″man standing alone.″ It is in its essence a right, the
enjoyment of which is entirely dependent upon social
forms. It is a profoundly social construct. It requires societal
construction, constraint, and enforcement. It is not something
that exists in the state of nature. It is a product of, as well as
a mainstay of, civil society. The point of the right, then,
cannot be to protect a natural, pre-civil sphere of individual
sovereignty that exists independent of the state or of state
law. No such sphere exists; we would not be contracting in
such a state. The civil right, again, is one we enjoy not only
by virtue of our membership in civil society, but also it is
one we cannot perfect on our own. The point of the right,
then, is to protect our participation in this thoroughly civil
sphere of bargain and exchange.
Let me put all of this together. The civil right to contract,
unlike the constitutional one, is not, at heart, a right to
self-sovereignty. Rather it is a [*565] right to participate in
markets of various sorts that are themselves conducive to
human flourishing. It is a right to enjoy access to the
32 See Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen, The Quality of Life (1993).
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benefits and goods facilitated by those aspects of civil
society that are structured by contract. There are clearly
several such aspects. First, and most directly, the acts of
barter, exchange, and bargain - the sale and purchase, for
example, of consumer goods - is a human activity that is
itself social and civil, and the right to contract is a right to
participate in that social and civil form of activity. The civil
right to contract then is a right to participate in various
markets of exchange.
Contract is also an activity that facilitates other forms of
social and civil life than that represented by simple bargains,
and the civil right to contract therefore is a right to
participate in those more complex forms of social and civil
life as well. Contract facilitates, for example, cooperative
enterprise that can lead to not only more complex, but also
more rewarding forms of living. The enjoyment of private
ownership of real property is one such form of life. It is
facilitated by property and property law, to which the civil
right of contract grants access. Similarly, contract facilitates
participation in the legal and institutional structures of
employment. Those structures in turn contribute to both our
individual security against want, and our societal enjoyment
of the products of our cooperative labor. The civil right to
contract is a right to participate in that world of employment.
Contract facilitates the pooling of life’s risks, both
catastrophic and mundane, such that when those risks come
to pass they can be weathered more smoothly. In turn, that
pooling of risk in turn leads to better health care, and hence
better health outcomes, meaning longer and healthier lives.
It facilitates cooperative action in all of these spheres -
markets, property, employment, health - that might otherwise
be precluded by familiar prisoners dilemmas, thus increasing
well-being all around. In all of these spheres, contract
facilitates a sharing of excess value that otherwise tends
toward either a winner-take-all or worse-outcomes-for-all
set of outcomes, increasing both inequality and
subordination. Rights to contract serve social and civil
values, and not just individualist ones.
III. CONTRACT RIGHTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS
The rights protected by the Civil Rights Acts, both those of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, are not in tension
with the right to contract if we understand the latter as a
civil, rather than natural or constitutional right, and if we
understand civil rights as including not only
nondiscrimination rights themselves, but as also including
the rights of which we cannot be discriminatorily deprived.
Again, the conflict between civil rights and contract rights
stems from viewing civil rights as simply [*566]
anti-discrimination rights, and contract rights as
quasi-constitutional or natural rights of individual self
sovereignty, delineating a sphere within which the individual
has sole authority to determine whether, with whom, and on
what terms to assume other-regarding obligations. However,
this rests on a misguided understanding of both the ideas of
″contract rights″ and of ″civil rights.″ Civil rights are not
simply rights against discrimination, they are, rather, rights
of participation; they are rights to participate in the spheres
of social or civil life that are themselves facilitated by laws
and institutions. The right to contract is not just a natural
and constitutional right to self-sovereignty, it is also one
such civil right. As such, it confers a right to participate in
markets for, among much else, consumer goods,
employment, insurance, and real property. Civil rights, in
brief, are rights of access to civil society. Contract rights are
rights to participate in those aspects of civil society facilitated
by private contract. Contract rights, far from being in
tension with civil rights, are themselves civil rights, and as
such, they protect access not only to consumer markets but
also to other civil rights, such as rights to property,
employment, and health care as well. So, civil rights are
contract rights, and contract rights are themselves civil
rights.
The civil right to nondiscrimination in employment protected
by Title VII 33 does not fundamentally limit contractual
freedom, when the latter is understood as a civil rather than
constitutional right, but rather, clearly expands it. Rights to
nondiscrimination in employment are rights to participate in
a sphere of contractual life that facilitates the provision and
compensation of labor in ways that, in turn, further the
individual’s interest in security and the societal interest in
enjoyment of the products of cooperative labor. Title VII
rights against discrimination in employment are themselves
simply a special kind of civil contract rights. They are rights
to contract in a literal sense; they extend the right to contract
for one’s labor to ones previously excluded. They are also
contract rights more broadly understood: they guarantee
participation in a sphere of life - employment - that is itself
structured through contracts and that collectively promotes
individual well-being and individual capabilities -
capabilities for meaningful and dignified work. Civil rights
guaranteed by Fair Housing Acts are likewise not in tension
with contract rights. Rather, those civil rights are contract
rights; they are rights to participate in markets for the
enjoyment, sale, and purchase of property that are themselves
facilitated by contract. The right of nondiscrimination in
employment and housing no more limits the right of
33 Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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contract than does extension of the right [*567] to vote limit
by diluting the power of the voting rights of those who
already possess them. Participation in markets for
employment and property is central to civil society. To echo
Paine, they are rights we have by virtue not only of our
humanity, but also by virtue of our membership in that
society. Guaranteeing that participation broadens and
deepens the right to contract, it does not limit it.
The rights to affordable health insurance guaranteed by the
Affordable Care Act likewise are not limits on the civil right
to contract; rather, they are themselves civil contract rights.
The right to insurance is not, after all, a right to health per
se but a right to a particular kind of contract; it guarantees
the right to participate in the pooling of risk of ill health that
makes the forbearance of medical illness less financially
catastrophic. The Affordable Care Act guarantees that
everyone, not just people with secure employment or with
considerable private resources, has access to that particular
form of contract, and the relative security against risk to
which it gives rise. Like Title VII or the Fair Housing Act,
it thus expands, rather than shrinks, the civil rights to
contract. To provide one final example, the Family and
Medical Leave Act, which requires employers to provide
unpaid leave for their employees with newborns or other
family members requiring care, clearly alters the terms of
employment contracts in ways that might not have been
willed by both parties in the absence of the law. 34
Nevertheless, it just as clearly expands access to the civil
right to contract. It makes it possible for new parents of
infants or grown children of elderly parents to continue their
employment uninterruptedly, thus maintaining their presence
in the contractual world of work. Contracts open the doors
to the world of employment. The Family and Medical Leave
Act ensures that those doors remain open, even after the
birth of a child or the sickness of a parent, events which in
the absence of the law, can cause a breach in the contractual
and interactive world of employment because of the urgency
or priority of the private and intimate world of caregiving.
Like anti-discrimination laws, and like The Affordable Care
Act, The Family and Medical Leave Act expands
participation in the world of contract, and the complexity,
security, risk-pooling, interactivity, and enrichment that
contract facilitates.
Thus, the civil rights protected by the Civil Rights Acts, as
well as those protected by The Affordable Care and the
Family and Medical Leave Acts, are not in conflict with the
″right to contract,″ if by the latter, we mean the civil right to
contract. The civil right to contract is a right to participate in
the spheres of life largely structured by contract and
contract [*568] law; the sale and purchase of consumer
goods, real property, insurance, employment, and higher
education. The civil rights acts of both centuries, the
Affordable Care Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act
all broaden and deepen participation in those contractual
spheres of life. They thereby broaden and deepen
participation in contract. The civil right to contract,
understood as a right to participate in the civil forms of life
made possible by contractual behavior, is strengthened, not
undermined, by the civil rights laws of both the nineteenth
and the mid-twentieth centuries.
And what of the last conflict noted above: the conflict
between a right to contract, on the one hand, and the duties
and obligations of civil society, including, possibly,
affirmative obligations to help others if we can do so at no
or little cost? Was Buchanan right in The Great Gatsby to
callously inform Wilson that he, Buchanan, did not, after all,
have to sell his car to him, and that if he did not, he would
owe him no obligation at all? Does contract so exhaust the
realm of other-regarding obligations that we are never
obligated to provide assistance outside of our contractual
and voluntarily assumed duties, which we are never obligated
to assume in the first place? Does the movement from status
to contract obviate obligations stemming from our ″status″
as members of a civil society?
It may indeed, if we regard contract as described above: a
natural or quasi-constitutional right to decide when, with
whom, and on what terms to assume other-regarding
obligations. But it may not, if we regard the right to contract
as a civil right protecting rights of participation in contractual
life, rather than as either a natural or constitutional right
protecting a private and individual sphere of sovereignty.
The civil right to contract is a right to enter those spheres of
civil society largely regulated by contract. Although, the
right itself is fully a product of that civil society, and the
world to which it guarantees entrance and participation is
likewise a product of civil society. The civil right to exercise
contractual authority then can exist side by side with other
civil rights and obligations including obligations to extend
help to others if such obligations originate in civil society
itself. Whether or not they do is another question. But if
they do, the existence of robust contract rights does not
stand in tension with them.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this essay I have tried to work out the implications of a
straightforward syllogism. The right to contract, according
34 See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (a)(1).
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to the drafters of the 1866 Act, is a civil right of which we
cannot be deprived by discriminatory action. Furthermore,
civil rights, according to Thomas Paine, at least since this
country’s beginnings, are those natural rights we [*569]
have by virtue of our membership in civil society and which
we cannot perfect on our own. The right to contract, then, as
a civil right, is a natural right we have by virtue of
membership in civil society and which we cannot perfect on
our own. Like other civil rights, it is a right to belong, or a
right to participate in the civil society, or those parts of civil
society to which contract gives access.
What parts of civil society are those? Contract structures the
public worlds of employment, health care, higher education,
and commerce. We enter the workforce, schooling,
commercial markets, and health care through contracts of
employment, enrollment, sale and purchase, or insurance.
Those worlds, to which contract gives entree, make our
lives better in familiar ways. Employment gives us security
against want as well as meaning in our productive lives -
schooling enriches, complexifies our lives, and improves
our chances for success. Commerce and commercialism
give a source of pleasure as well as access to markets that
enrich us, and insurance allows us to guard against calamities
by pooling risks with others. A civil right to contract then
confers rights to participate in those worlds. A civil right to
contract free of discrimination simply extends those rights
of entry, participation, and belonging to those who had
previously been excluded either because of enslavement,
discrimination, racism, or sexism. None of these contractual
realms would be possible, or even conceivable with the laws
and institutions of civil society. The civil right to contract
ensures for everyone, not just those who are privileged, or
those with whom others wish to deal, or those to whom
Buchanan deigns to sell his car, access to those institutions,
and to the benefits of the laws that constitute them that
allow all of us to flourish.
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